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Abstract We now live in the era of big data, and according to its proponents, big data
is poised to change science as we know it. Claims of having no theory and no ideology
are made, and there is an assumption that the results of big data are trustworthy because
it is considered free from human judgement, which is often considered inextricably
linked with human error. These two claims lead to the idea that big data is the source of
better scientific knowledge, through more objectivity, more data, and better analysis. In
this paper I analyse the philosophy of science behind big data and make the claim that
the death of many traditional sciences, and the human scientist, is much exaggerated.
The philosophy of science of big data means that there are certain things big data does
very well, and some things that it cannot do. I argue that humans will still be needed for
mediating and creating theory, and for providing the legitimacy and values science
needs as a normative social enterprise.
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Introduction
This is a world where massive amounts of data and applied mathematics replace
every other tool that might be brought to bear. Out with every theory of human
behavior, from linguistics to sociology. Forget taxonomy, ontology, and psychol-
ogy. Who knows why people do what they do? The point is they do it, and we can
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track and measure it with unprecedented fidelity. With enough data, the numbers
speak for themselves (Anderson 2008).
Many say we now live in the era of big data (Boyd and Crawford 2012; Chen et al.
2012; Sivarajah et al. 2016). Big data is a phenomenon revolving around the endeavour
of accumulating massive amounts of data and using it to understand the objects from
which we are gathering data. Combined with the technology of machine learning and
artificial intelligence, it is possible to argue that much knowledge is now produced
autonomously by the tools scientists have made, and not directly by the scientists
themselves. As big data has gained prominence, it has spread from the fields of
business and computer science into society at large and just about every other science.
Is the crowning achievement of the era of big data that big data itself becomes some
form of master science, displacing other forms of science and changing the role of the
human scientist completely?
Proponents of big data often make the dual claims of having no theory and
no ideology. In addition to this, there is an assumption that the results of big
data are trustworthy because it is considered free from human judgement, which
is often considered inextricably linked with human error. These two claims lead
to the idea that big data is the source of better scientific knowledge, in
particular with respect to objectivity. I argue that that big data is better at
some forms of objectivity, particularly the mechanical and aperspectival ver-
sions, but that this comes at a price (Daston 1992). I show that in terms of
philosophy of science big data has a certain likeness to behaviourism, and that
this means that there are certain things big data can be used for, and other
things it cannot help us with. My main argument is, therefore, that there will
still be a role for human beings in science, both when it comes to mediating
and creating theory and for providing the legitimacy and values science needs
as a normative social enterprise.
The Advent of Big Data and the Philosophy of Science behind it
Big data is a term that may simply refer to large amounts of data, in which case it would
not be particularly useful. Humans have been gathering data for a long time and have
become increasingly proficient at gathering larger and larger amounts of it (Marr 2015).
I choose to use the term for describing today’s usage of the term, which according to
Marr's (2015) brief history of big data started with Anderson's (2008) article that was
quoted at the very beginning of this paper. There are, however, important similarities
between the rise of big data and previous quantitative endeavours in science, and these
will be commented upon where relevant. I rely on Laney's (2001) well established
definition of big data, which consists of the three V’s: volume, velocity, and variety
(Laney 2001). Volume refers to the massive amounts of data collected, velocity to the
speed of data generation and analysis, and variety to the Bstructural heterogeneity^ in
the data (Gandomi and Haider 2014, p. 137). Big data has become an interdisciplinary
phenomenon, and the amounts of data we now have means there are new requirements
for both data analysis and data handling (Bello-Orgaz et al. 2016, p. 45; Boyd and
Crawford 2012, p. 662).
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In order to determine what role big data can and cannot play in science, it is
necessary to examine its underlying philosophy of science. What assumptions are
made when employing big data – implicitly and explicitly? Furthermore, what conse-
quences does these assumptions have for the possibility of generating knowledge with
the use of big data? I will first examine some of the claims of theory neutrality and the
focus on behaviour. Then I will look briefly at the possibility of the computer as a
scientist, followed by some critical remarks related to the neutrality, ideology and
research agendas of big data. The section is concluded by a brief summary of the
philosophy of big data.
Post-Theory and Behaviorism
Brooks (2013) states that B[t]he theory of big data is to have no theory, at least about
human nature. You just gather huge amounts of information, observe the patterns and
estimate probabilities about how people will act in the future^ (Brooks 2013). This
statement implies that big data is set to become some sort of master science, making
traditional disciplines obsolete, and the theoretical activity of classical science a thing of
the past. The quote seems to imply that big data, by its logic of accumulation and
discovery of patterns our human minds are unable to find, makes disciplines such
as philosophy and parts of psychology obsolete. It is as if certain theories, for
example those of human nature that has long guided the social sciences, has only
been an endeavour undertaken in lieu of the possibility of gathering enough data
and analysing it properly.
The ideology behind big data is in many ways similar to the approach of the
behaviourists in psychology. According to this approach, the Bblack box^ of conscious
thought is either considered to be of little interest or it is simply assumed to be
unavailable for scientific purposes, and thus ignored. Koestler (1967) is an interesting
critic of the advent of behaviourism. He readily admits that a lot can be explained by
behaviourism, but that there are obviously many things that can not be captured by this
approach. He mentions Bscientific discovery and artistic originality^ as one such field,
something I return to in the section where I discuss the role of the human scientist
(Koestler 1967, p. 13).
What people think they want, and what they think they are like, is of little interest.
The data we gather lets us know individuals better than they know themselves, so why
bother with subjective perceptions? Psychology may still continue as a science of
explaining what goes on inside people’s minds, and how they experience the world,
but for understanding what they’ll do, theories of motivation, preferences, and actions
are no longer needed when we have big data. If such a quest for an objective science of
man and society accurately portrays the rise of big data, the following words by Burt,
addressed at the rise of behaviourism, seems to have continued relevance today:
The result, as a cynical onlooker might be tempted to say, is that psychology,
having first bargained away its soul and then gone out of its mind, seems now, as
it faces an untimely end, to have lost all consciousness (Burt 1962, p. 229).
This is somewhat similar to the economic theory of revealed preferences. Here we infer
preferences from behaviour alone. Individuals are observed, and Bthe individual
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guinea-pig, by his market behaviour, reveals his preference pattern – if there is such a
consistent pattern^ (Samuelson 1948, p. 243). By asking people what they want we are
wasting time, because a) it is unnecessary since we have the data to predict it, and b)
because people might not really know themselves or the basis of their actions anyway.
This resembles what Sayer (2010, p. 22) labels radical behaviourism, whose
Bproponents insist that the meanings people attach to their actions and to other objects
play no part in determining what they do^. How big data relates to the concept of
liberty and identity formation are also very important issues, but something I will not
pursue in this paper. For readers interested in these topics, I recommend reading Cohen
(2013) and Yeung (2017).
The Computer Scientist, as in: The Computer that Does Science
In the introduction I mentioned that some see big data as computers doing science
without human involvement. Sure, we have built the computers and the tools for
gathering and analysing data, but these tools now to a certain degree act without our
supervision. What we mean by computer Bintelligence^ has changed drastically from
the early days of computing. Human programmers previously made detailed instruc-
tions for the computers, detailing the possible situations that could arise (Bif^-clauses)
and telling the computer what the proper reaction is (Bthen^-instructions). What is new
with machine learning is that we instead of giving detailed instructions on how to react
to given situation merely give the computers certain goals and a data set. We then set
the computer to work, rather blindly, and let it sift through all the material in order to
find interesting patterns. For purely analytical purposes the patterns and correlations
themselves are interesting. In addition to discovering patterns, we employ artificial
intelligence that acts on this information and adjusts the various variables under its
control in order to reach the given goal in the best possible way. This is the approach
that lets computers beat humans at games such as Chess and Go, stealing headlines and
awing professionals and amateurs alike by moves far beyond our grasp (Campbell et al.
2002; Chouard 2016; Google 2018; Kurzweil 2015, p. 148).
Theoretically blind, with human nature being considered both unnecessary for, and
even an obstacle to, good science; big data analysts Bare not like novelists, ministers,
psychologists … coming up with intuitive narratives to explain the causal chains of
why things are happening^ (Brooks 2013). Neither Ba priori knowledge, nor herme-
neutic sensibilities^ is required for gaining insight with big data, and human beings are
little more than Bdata custodians and curators^ (Baruh and Popescu 2017, p. 583). This
then, is an age of Bknowledge without visionaries^, with Binnovation without innova-
tors, purged of the sloppiness, bias and incompleteness that attends ordinary human
endeavours^ (Cohen 2013, p. 2921). Cohen points to the irony of the fact that while we
hold innovation so highly we are at the same time Bseeking a modality for innovation
that will transcend individual agency altogether^ (Cohen 2013, 1922). Chen et al.
(2012) discuss the various ways in which big data will impact various fields,
and in science and technology they list BS&T innovation^ and Bknowledge
discovery^ as two of the applications of big data, and the impacts of big data
application will be advances in science (Chen et al. 2012, p. 1173). The authors
are, however, more focused on how big data lets scientists analyse more data
more effectively than on big data changing science.
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When humans become little more than Bdata custodians and curators^ it is easy to
imagine a future in which the education of scientists consists of teaching students of
various disciplines programming, data analysis, and advanced statistics. The advice for
students looking to be attractive is clear: learn to handle and analyse data, learn
Bdatabases, machine learning, econometrics, statistics, visualization, and so^ (Chen
et al. 2012, p. 1165–6). The most successful up-and-comers Bno longer work for
BEnron, Lehman Brothers, or AIG; now they work for Goole or Target or Acxiom,
pursuing the holy grail of knowing customers better than they know themselves^
(Cohen 2013, p. 1923). The fascination with statistics and its potential is, however,
not new. In 1897 Oliver Wendell Holmen Jr. stated that Bthe man of the future is the
man of statistics^ (Cohen 2013, p. 1928). Some also point to the similarities between
big data and previous quantitative movements in science. One of these was geography’s
quantitative revolution some 45 years ago, which lead to many of the same discussions
that we are having in relation to the rise of big data (Barnes 2013). One central point in
these quantitative shifts is that when theory creation is no longer a business for humans,
our role becomes limited to making the systems that do science and setting them to
work. I will return to the obvious point that choosing where and how to employ these
systems is still a very human aspect of big data.
Ideology and Research Agendas
There are three fundamental problems with big data, according to Cohen (2013). First
of all is the fact that the research agendas are often hidden, and Bobservers have begun
to point to a ‘credibility crisis’ that derives from inadequate disclosure of data sets and
methods^ (Cohen 2013, p. 1924). This is related the point made by Gandomi and
Haider (2014) that big data has bypassed academic analysis. Much of what is done with
big data is done by large corporations that do not publish in academic channels or
adhere to academic standards of transparency and disclosure. Businesses adopting
various methods to achieve their own goals without disclosing them is of course no
new phenomenon. However, the fact that big data has become so powerful, and that so
much of it is controlled by corporations, makes it a more pressing issue – especially
relating to issues of power dynamics, individual liberty and the formation of selves
(Cohen 2013). An issue related to this problem is that machine learning based on big
data sometimes fail. Due to the complexity of big data analytics, humans have a hard
time understanding the results of machine learning. This is quite natural, due to the fact
that these computer systems have surpassed human capacities in many areas. A
thorough examination of how and why big data analytics sometimes fails is beyond
the scope of this paper, but some examples shows the important of the issue. First of all,
big data has Bmarginalized regulatory schema^ by Bevading current privacy protections
with its novel methodology^ (Crawford and Schultz 2014). This is a problem, the
authors state, because the predictive use of big data profiles today influences people’s
lives and opportunities in many important ways, but the profiles may be deeply
problematic (Crawford and Schultz 2014). They may simply be inaccurate, in which
case the effects are varied and hard to evaluate, but they can also be discriminatory in
several ways. First of all, analysis based purely on historical data will contain many
traces of historical discriminatory practices, which cannot be corrected simply by
removing variables such as gender and ethnicity. Furthermore, companies can actively
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circumvent anti-discrimination policy by finding proxies for the variables that they are
forbidden to base their choices on (Crawford and Schultz 2014, p. 100). Even if you
remove gender from a data set, there are countless ways to identify women by looking
at the vast amounts of other variables and data available, and thus veiling
discriminatory practices. Hirsch (2014) is another good source for more information
on how big data can lead to both intended and accidental discrimination practices.
The second is that there is an underlying ideology inherent in big data, as it Bis the
ultimate expression of a mode of rationality that equates information with truth and
more information with more truth, and that denies the possibility that information
processing designed simply to identify ‘patterns’ might be systematically infused with
a particular ideology^ (Cohen 2013, p. 1924). Big data is not, and cannot be, neutral,
and the concept of predictive rationality is fundamental to the phenomenon. Predictive
rationality is most often used in management literature and is sometimes uses as a
synonym to rational choice theory (Flowers et al. 2017). According to Sarasvathy
(2001) it involves a) goals, b) alternative means or causes to the goal, c) constraints on
means, and d) criteria for selecting between means (Sarasvathy 2001, p. 249). The
problem, however, is that the ideology and the values it endorses are hidden, and often
pretended away (Cohen 2013, p. 1925). There are several strands in this argument: First
of all, we have the fact that human beings build the systems that interpret big data, they
are involved in tweaking these systems, in where they are applied, and finally in
interpreting how they work. This human involvement is at times veiled, or pretended
away, but it is hard to argue that no ideology can be introduced in any (or all) of these
stages. The second, and vitally important, part, is that Anderson's (2008) view that
B[w]ith enough data, the numbers speak for themselves^ is what Barnes (2013, p. 300)
calls Bdata determinism with a vengeance^. The idea that data can be considered neutral
is a view that has been attacked by many, but in this context, it suffices to relate Sayer's
(2010) important criticism of this position. He states that Btheory is increasingly
recognized as affecting observation itself, so that the latter is said to be ‘theory-laden’B
(Sayer 2010, p. 46). Barnes (2013, p. 300) nicely summarises the main points of
Sayer’s criticism of the uncritical use of quantification and observation, in that
Bnumbers are never innocent, speaking for themselves, but always come marked by
prior theorization: they are theory laden^ and Bemerge only from particular social
institutions, arrangements and organizations mobilised by power, political agendas and
vested interests^. Knowledge based solely on experience and observation Bthen be-
comes at least highly ambiguous^ (Sayer 2010, p. 46). Lastly, we have the fact that big
data, as a purely descriptive science, Bis inherently conservative^ (Barnes 2013). As a
descriptive science, big data must assume that the future will resemble the past, or at the
very least that past trends will develop in similar ways into the future. When my
predictions, recommendations and understandings are wholly based on past data, this
necessarily leads towards a preservation of what is – the status quo. While not a bad
thing in and of itself, it must be understood, and some will desire theories that does not
Bmerely describe the world, that is, simply conformed to the data, but changed the
world, and along with it the numbers itself^ (Barnes 2013, p. 300).
The third problem is that big data leads to a society in which subjectivity is shaped
Bin the service of self-interested agendas of powerful economic actors^ (Cohen 2013, p.
1925). This is a very important problem, but one that cannot be examined in more detail
in the current paper. Subjectivity is itself subject to influences, and the problem arises
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when the Btechniques of Big Data subject individuals to predictive judgements about
their preferences, and the process of modulation also shapes and produces those
preferences^ (Cohen 2013, p. 1925). In short: there is little transparency and control,
there is an underlying ideology that is often ignored, and the techniques employed has
real effects of individuals and society.
Baruh and Popescu (2017) refers to Cohen (2013) and her suggestion that Bthe
ideological effect of big data is the denial of the existence of ideology and bias^
(Baruh and Popescu 2017, p. 583). Boyd and Crawford (2012) has written an
article with 6 challenges to big data, whereas the two first is that big data Bchanges
the definition of knowledge^ and that its B[c]laims to objectivity are misleading^
(Boyd and Crawford 2012, p. 662).
When proponents of big data suggest that their approach is neutral, and that one
has transgressed the traditional obstacles to an objective science, that cannot be
taken as much more than a lack of understanding of how science and methodology
works. In the words of Cohen (2013), Bthe denial of ideology is itself an ideo-
logical position^ (Cohen 2013, p. 1924).
Practical Philosophical and Methodological Choices (or Necessities)
It is time now to summarise some of the above and position big data in relation to some
of the central concepts used in science and methodology. In terms of philosophy of
science, big data can surely be described as a positivist scheme. Positivism is in
textbooks on research methods characterised by phenomenalism, deductivism,
inductivism, objectivity, and science as a positive/descriptive, and not normative,
endeavour (Bryman 2008, p. 13). I’ll return to the point of inductivism, and will only
note that the reason both deduction and induction is mentioned, comes from the fact
that we do create theories from the data we gather, and we also gather the data we do
because we are to a certain degree guided by theories (Bryman 2008, p. 13).
It is clearly empiricist, in that the only acknowledged source of knowledge is
observable facts, mediated by reason and logic. The observable facts are the data we
gather in various ways, whereas machine learning and AI is used to supply the
reasoning and the logic necessary to create knowledge from the data. Related to this
is big data’s logic of aggregation, which relates to Cohen’s description of this approach
as one Bthat equates information with truth and more information with more truth^
(Cohen 2013, p. 1924). With big data and machine learning, more information both
strengthens the resulting theories, and increases the capacities of our computers through
the improved learning opportunities. However, if observations are theory-laden, it is
difficult to accept a position that considers it a foundation of truth without the need of
mediation (Sayer 2010).
Theories about correlations and causation can thus be formed a posteriori by smart
computers capable of spotting patterns and analysing how variables are connected and
what variables causes change in others. There is no need for human activity in this
process, as the parts required by humans has already been played out when we provided
the machines with knowledge of statistics and what qualifies as experience in the form
of data sets, plus the ability to learn without our help just by going through these data
sets. As such, big data is an inductive scientific enterprise, gathering and the going
through it in order to find patterns and build theories about dependencies and causation.
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However, if we look at big data science where computers are involved in explaining the
findings and making sense of the many possible hypothesis put forth by computers, we
have science that resemble Ba type of reasoning that begins by examining data and after
scrutiny of these data, entertains all possible explanations for the observed data, and
then forms hypotheses to confirm or disconfirm until the researcher arrives at the most
plausible interpretation of the observed data^ (Charmaz 2006, p. 186). This is Charmaz'
(2006) definition of abductive science, and Kitchin (2014, p. 5) states that big data
science is rather pragmatic, and open for Bhybrid combination of abductive, inductive
and deductive approaches to advance the understanding of a phenomenon^.
Big data is surely quantitative in its nature, and Bthe ideology of big data naturalizes
algorithmic analysis of quantitative data as the paramount expression of truth^ (Baruh
and Popescu 2017, p. 583). Proponents of big data may argue that you could also
analyse qualitative material like texts, music and photographs by method of big data,
but that would imply a lack of understanding of how computers actually analyse the
material. Yes, the mentioned forms of data may be considered qualitative if interpreted
by a human social scientist employing hermeneutics or other similar methods, but that
is not what the computer does. When the computer receives a picture, it is transformed
into code – into 0’s and 1’s. This is what it analyses. When working with full texts, it
also employs the qualitative method of counting words, comparing structures etc., and
not interpretative methods. Furthermore, as already touched upon, most of the data is
coded by humans, and cannot be considered objective or neutral in themselves (Sayer
2010). Some might argue that human cognition involves decoding all impressions in
similar ways, and that we just believe we perceive wholes and truly qualitative material.
Gestalt psychology is an interesting theoretical direction in this respect, and I will
assume that humans do perceive wholes as Bdifferent from the sum of its parts^ (Rock
and Palmer 1990).
I have also argued that big data is mainly concerned with behaviour, as opposed to
cognition. I base my view on the fact that while one can surely use big data on surveys
where people are asked about their evaluations or subjective experiences, the goal is not
primarily to understand what goes on inside people’s minds, but to understand how
these answers translates into behaviour. We may come to understand that being
dissatisfied with the level of care in a municipality is connected with a desire to
relocate, but big data cannot help us with the process that explains this correlation.
The lack of understanding of process does not mean that big data is not combined
with theories of process in order to guide behaviour. A prime example is how
companies use personal data from social media and combine it with psychological
theories of motivation and action in order to influence voting behaviour etc. Cambridge
Analytica in the 2018 scandal involving Facebook is one example (Greenfield 2018).
This approach to the application of big data relies on a methodology resembling that of
Sunstein and Thaler's (2003) nudge theory.
All of this comes together to form a picture where much of the traditional social
science methodology is a poor fit, whereas natural science methodology, mathematics,
econometrics, etc. fits very well. Objectivity seems to be one of the main arguments for
the style of science that follows the approach of big data. We can speak of ontological,
mechanical, and aperspectival objectivity, and the two last ones are perhaps particu-
larly interesting here (Daston 1992). Aperspectival objectivity involves Beliminating
individual (or occasionally group, as in the case of national styles or
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anthropomorphism) idiosyncrasies^, while mechanical objectivity Bis about suppress-
ing the universal human propensity to judge and to aestheticize^ (Daston 1992, p. 599).
When we remove the human scientist from the equation, both human propensities and
human perspectives are overcome, right? One could argue that both is built into our
computers, our methods of analysis, and the data itself, but for our current purposes we
will be satisfied with stating that proponents of big data claim to achieve high scores in
these layers of objectivity.
I expect some to argue that I am now shoehorning what is a relatively infantile
phenomenon, filled with variation and theoretically not very well developed, into old
and ill-fitting categories. This objection can hardly be dismissed, as there are surely
many people employing big data in ways at odds with what I have just described. This
is partly a result of the fact that much research based on big data seems rather
pragmatic. Gandomi and Haider (2014) discusses this phenomenon, and the fact that
big data is philosophically underdeveloped. The meteoric rise of big data has lead
researchers to Bleapfrog to books and other electronic media for immediate and wide
circulation of their work^, instead of developing the approach in regular academic
channels (Gandomi and Haider 2014, p. 137). Regardless of the somewhat eclectic
philosophical approach of big data applications, I stand by my argument that these are
the underlying philosophical assumptions most descriptive of the endeavour of big
data. For a more detailed discussion of the philosophy of big data, see Melanie Swan’s
article dedicated to the subject (Swan 2015).
The Role for the Human Scientist
Having examined the philosophy of science of big data, it is time for humanity to make
its case for still playing a part in future science. In the first part, I relate some arguments
from classical philosophers of science, that together form the impression that science is
a form of art – something not merely technical, but in need of both passion and
creativity. I am aware that if pushed too far, this line of reasoning stands in danger of
making science something mystical. While thus placing it outside the reach of com-
puters, some will say I have merely replaced one problem with an even bigger problem.
I do not claim that science is a mystical art, forever beyond the reach of computers, but
I do argue that science requires certain forms of creativity and serendipitous human
ingenuity that are, at present, not available for computers. I then relate some ideas
about objectivity and normativity in science in the last part of the section.
The Scientist as Artist
For Michael Polanyi, scientific discovery Breveals new knowledge^, but the accompa-
nying vision is to him not knowledge; B[i]t is less than knowledge, for it is a guess; but
it is more than knowledge, for it is a foreknowledge of things unknown and at present
perhaps inconceivable^ (Polanyi 1962, p. 135). Even further, he claims that any
Bprocess of enquiry unguided by intellectual passions would inevitably spread out into
a desert of trivialities^ (Polanyi 1962, p. 135).
Intellectual passions are central, as they can Bevoke intimations of specific discov-
eries and sustain their persistent pursuit^ (Polanyi 1962, p. 151). What he calls the
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Bheuristic function^ of scientific passion is that an appreciation for science merges Binto
the capacity for discovering it; even as the artist’s sensibility merges into his creative
powers^ (Polanyi 1962, p. 151). He says there is such a thing as Bcreative scientists^
that are occupied with Btrying to guess right^, and the work is creative both because
of the process of discovering new knowledge and because it irreversibly
changes our societies (Polanyi 1962, p. 151). When something new is discov-
ered, new interpretative frameworks are required, as the old ones no longer help
us understand what we now know. Science, in the form of discovery, is thus
creative, as Bit is not to be achieved by the diligent performance of any
previously known and specifiable procedure^ (Polanyi 1962, p. 151).
Karl Popper, in a somewhat similar vein, compares the scientist to the artist (Popper
1989). One of his main points is the somewhat disinterested (in terms of applications)
way true artists and scientists pursue their creative work – B[n]either Planck nor
Einstein, neither Rutherford nor Bohr, thought of a possible application of the atomic
theory^ (Popper 1989, p. 38). They Bsearch for the sake of the search^, and the pursuit
of science has its roots in Bpoetical and religious myths^ and has less to do with the
mere collection of facts in order to find new applications (Popper 1989, p. 39). For
Popper, the aim of science is the search for truth, and the process that gets us there is an
artistic one (Popper 1989, p. 40). Nowhere does he say that information alone will get
us there. The picture Popper paints fits rather poorly with the idea that machines sifting
through masses of data can replace the human scientist. Unless we grant computer the
gift of creativity and purposeful action, that is. In this article I will assume that
computers are not yet autonomous in this way. It is of course a topic of great interest,
and should computers get there, it certainly has implications for the need of humans in
science.
Nowadays in circles of youth there is a widespread notion that science has
become a problem in calculation, fabricated in laboratories or statistical filing
just as 'in a factory,' a calculation involving only the cool and not one's 'heart and
soul' (Weber 1958, p. 113)
Weber, in his Science as a Vocation, discusses the move towards calculation and
statistics in certain disciplines, and emphatically states that there must exist ideas in
someone’s minds for the calculating endeavour to be valuable, and that Bsuch intuition
cannot be forced^ (Weber 1958, p. 113). Calculation and information alone will not get
us far. These ideas are both fickle and impossible to willingly produce, and once again
we are lead into rather mystical terrain where intuition and inspiration makes science
more akin to art than a purely technical process. Weber states that Binspiration plays no
less a role in science than it does in the realm of art^, and while the processes of painters
and scientists may be somewhat different, Bthe psychological processes do not differ.
Both are frenzy (in the sense of Plato’s ‘mania’) and ‘inspiration’B (Weber 1958, p. 113).
If science is an art, then, perhaps artificial intelligence is not yet quite up to the task
of fully replacing the human scientist. According to Boden, B[c]reativity is a funda-
mental feature of human intelligence, and an inescapable challenge for AI^ (Boden
1998, p. 347). She writes that there are three types of creativity, in that it either consist
of a) combining known concepts in unknown ways, b) exploring the adjustment of the
constellation of existing structures or c) transforming the space in which known
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structures exist (Boden 1998, p. 348). Although many philosophers have claimed that
no such thing as a truly new idea arises from human creativity, we might do well not to
conclude that this means that machines have the same potential for creativity. Let’s say
that the combinatorial mode of creativity is what interests us. A computer may create a
fantastical amount of new possible constellations of existing concepts and phenome-
non, but the real task of innovation is to determine which ones have potential and which
ones don’t. Here we return to the educated intuition of human beings. To the scientists
with the intellectual passions Polanyi described, some new constellations will stand out
and be perceived as very interesting. The scientist may not even understand why he
gets this sensation, but the intuitive recognition of valuable information, derived from
an education is science, is hard to program into a computer. Boden discusses the
problem of giving a computer the tools needed to properly evaluate the new ideas it
comes up with:
Identifying the criteria we use in our evaluations is hard enough. Justifying, or
even (causally) explaining, our reliance on those criteria is more difficult still.
For example, just why we like or dislike something will often have a lot to do with
motivational and emotional factors – considerations about which current Al has
almost nothing to say (Boden 1998, p. 347).
Boden (1998) writes that the ability of AI to both find novel ideas and convince us of its
value would be the Bultimate vindication of AI^, but ends with stating that B[w]e are a
very long way from that^ (Boden 1998, p. 355). In a more recent article, Lake et al.
(2017) discuss how new AI systems based on Bdeep neural networks^ are inspired by
human biology. Despite the progress made, Bthese systems differ from human intelli-
gence in crucial ways^, and the authors specifically propose AI systems that Bbuild
causal models of the world that support explanation and understanding, rather than
merely solving pattern recognition problems^ (Lake et al. 2017). One of the problems
computer engineers face are, as we have seen, that some Bhuman cognitive abilities
remain difficult to understand computationally, including creativity, common sense,
and general-purpose rea- soning^ (Lake et al. 2017, p. 3). They state that B[c]reativity is
often thought to be a pinnacle of human intelligence^, and that Bwe are still far from
developing AI systems that can tackle these types of tasks,^ although the authors have
hope for some progress (Lake et al. 2017, p. 24).
Even if we should wish to grant computers the possibility of judging (and thus
perhaps creating) truly inspired works of art, a final objection to the computer scientist
must be raised: science is in part a social and democratic endeavour, subject to the
normative evaluations of the societies in question. What we value and desire will
change over time and between cultures. The role science has in social development and
in reflecting societal values can hardly be overestimated, and I am inclined to believe
that this aspect of science means that there must be humans involved in the scientific
endeavour in order for it to be perceived as both legitimate and valuable.
We have seen that Brooks (2013) described big data analysts as being Bnot like
novelists, ministers, psychologists… coming up with intuitive narratives to explain the
causal chains of why things are happening^ (Brooks 2013). If this is so, big data
analysts are perhaps doing something apart from science as discussed by Polanyi,
Popper and Weber?
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The Objective Scientist and Science as a Normative Endeavour
Cohen (2013) brought forth some problematic aspects of big data. Firstly, the method-
ological choices one makes has important ramifications for the kind of answers one can
get. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, that no approach is neutral. The tech-
niques of big data Bcannot themselves decide which questions to investigate, cannot
instruct us how to place data flows and patterns in larger conceptual or normative
perspective, and cannot tell us whether and when it might be fair and just to limit data
processing in the service of other values^ (Cohen 2013, p. 1922). Human beings are
still involved in building, tweaking, evaluating, applying, and interpreting the results of
the computer systems used in big data, which makes statements about human
obsolescence seem wildly premature. Cohen (2013) argues that big data can never
Breplace either human-driven modelling or the prior decisions about direction and
scope that set the substantive and ethical parameters for particular programs of
investigation^ (Cohen 2013, p. 1923). While it cannot replace it, it certainly can
displace it (Cohen 2013, p. 1926). Predictive rationality can be a threat to important
social values, as it can Bcrowd out other kinds of motivators – altruism, empathy, and so
on – that might spur innovation in different directions, and it can even displace
alternative Bkinds of agendas for human flourishing^ (Cohen 2013, p. 1926–7). As
we have seen, the descriptive character of big data means that predictions and research
based on it tend to protect the status quo (Barnes 2013, p. 300).
All of Cohen’s points take us back to my point about science being both a social and
a democratic undertaking. Merton (1973) writes of the various ways in which science is
connected to society, and that it is dependent Bon particular types of social structure^
(Merton 1973, p. 267). Scientists are Ban integral element of society^ with the
obligations and interests that comes with this, and science is not a Bself-validating
enterprise which was in society but not of it^ (Merton 1973, p. 267–8). In this context
he describes the ethos of science, which contains the Bvalues and norms which is held
to be binding on the man of science^ – norms promulgated through Bprescriptions,
proscriptions, preferences, and permissions^ (Merton 1973, p. 268–9). While one could
argue that this ethos is technical, and could possibly be implemented in autonomous
computers, Merton states that these are moral mores that are binding due to being
considered Bright and good^ (Merton 1973, p. 270). As of yet I know of few that are
willing to consider computers capable of morality in a full sense, and not merely ethics
as behaviour according to set rules.
When I call science a democratic undertaking, I am more concerned with the aspect
of science that involves the power to influence one’s own society through scientific
activity, or the critique of such activity. I am not stating that science is a phenomenon of
democratic regimes, a point also made by Merton (1973, p. 269). However, I argue that
a part of what gives science legitimacy is the democratic qualities inherent in Merton’s
four Binstitutional imperatives^ of science: universalism, communism, disinterested-
ness, and organised scepticism (Merton 1973, p. 270).
Another point made by Cohen is that big data creates some challenges related to
research ethics. This arises from the fact that private commercial entities are in charge
of both gathering and analysing much of what we understand as big data, and that this
Brepresents the de facto privatization of human subject research, without the procedural
and ethical safeguards that traditionally have been required^ (Cohen 2013, p. 1925).
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This is obviously a big problem with how big data is employed today, but it is not an
integral feature of big data. Big data and the underlying philosophy that I discuss in this
paper could just as well follow regular standards of research ethics, including commu-
nalism as discussed by Merton (1973, p. 273).
Conclusion
In this paper we have seen that certain forms of science are being colonised by big data.
For good reason, too, when it comes to some of the science that is performed. I have not
argued that big data has no place in science, but merely that there is still room for
something other than big data and the advent of the computer as a scientist.
Some might claim that some sciences that rely on quantitative methods and the
approach of the natural sciences is a good fit for big data-based science. Here they use
quantification, as much information as possible, and advanced statistical methods, so all
will be better with computers, they might say. Even further, the last obstacle to real
objectivity, the human being, could even be replaced by computers. I have shown that
while the first statements might very well be true, we are far away from being able to
accept the third.
In addition, if we look at the disciplines not ruled by the logic of aggregation,
computers have less to contribute. I compared big data science with behaviourism –
even radical behaviourism – and the main point was that while this approach is good
for certain purposes, there are things it cannot do. While big data analysts may explain
behaviour and other easily observable and codifiable phenomenon, some of us will still
be interested in the internal processes that causes behaviour. We do not get this from
data, but from the softer sciences dealing with such phenomena as human motivation,
cognition, philosophy and morality. This means that we still need sciences that are not
in accordance with the ideals of big data and positivism. When we need interpretation
instead of statistical analysis, humans do things computers can’t. When truly qualitative
phenomena are to be analysed as wholes, the computers must resign. When my
thoughts, and not my actions, are the goals of explanation, I must turn to humans,
and when processes and causal explanations are required, I need more than observable
behaviour and facts – the only things the computer accepts.
Human scientists are still necessary, for two reasons. The first is the fact that science
is in many ways like the arts, as described by Polanyi, Weber and Popper. As of yet,
computers can perform just about every act conceivable, but the creativity, intuition and
instincts involved in the process of developing theories and guiding their applications,
is still beyond reach of the computer. If we are to avoid the Bdesert of trivialities^ that
Polanyi spoke of, we need the intellectual passion of human beings. We have good
reason for applying our new computer tools to scientific problems, but we also have
very good reason to reject statements that theory is dead, that science is now neutral,
and that there is no longer any need for humans in other roles than in creating and
running computer programs.
The second reason is that the how, what and why of the scientific endeavour is not
yet possible without human involvement, especially if we are to retain legitimacy and
respect for the democratic basis of science as a part of a society’s pool of common
goods. One aspect of this is that when some pretend that humans are not involved in big
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data science, they simply veil the influence some people and organisations have in the
creation, application, and interpretation of the data systems and the science that results
from them. Science is of course not directed by popular control or politics, but it
certainly develops in symbiosis with society at large. Science is more than a technical
exercise. It is also a moral undertaking, that requires it to be directed and controlled by
moral beings. For now, that means that human beings still have a crucial part to play in
the future of all sciences.
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